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Abstract 
 
This paper takes its root in a trivial observation: management approaches are unable 
to provide relevant guidelines to cope with uncertainty, and trust of our modern 
worlds.  Thus, managers are looking for reducing uncertainty through information’s 
supported decision-making, sustained by ex-ante rationalization. They strive to 
achieve best possible solution, stability, predictability, and control of “future”.  Hence, 
they turn to a plethora of “prescriptive panaceas”, and “management fads” to bring 
simple solutions through best practices. However, these solutions are ineffective. 
They address only one part of a system (e.g. an organization) instead of the whole. 
They miss the interactions and interdependencies with other parts leading to 
“suboptimization”. Further classical cause-effects investigations and researches are 
not very helpful to this regard.   
 
Where do we go from there? In this conversation, we want to challenge the 
assumptions supporting the traditional management approaches and shed some 
lights on the problem of management discourse fad using the concept of maturity and 
maturity models in the context of temporary organizations as support for reflexion. 
Global economy is characterized by use and development of standards and 
compliance to standards as a practice is said to enable better decision-making by 
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managers in uncertainty, control complexity, and higher performance. Amongst the 
plethora of standards, organizational maturity and maturity models hold a specific 
place due to general belief in organizational performance as dependent variable of 
(business) processes continuous improvement, grounded on a kind of evolutionary 
metaphor.  
 
Our intention is neither to offer a new “evidence based management fad” for 
practitioners, nor to suggest research gap to scholars. Rather, we want to open an 
assumption-challenging conversation with regards to main stream approaches (neo-
classical economics and organization theory), turning “our eyes away from the 
blinding light of eternal certitude towards the refracted world of turbid finitude” (Long, 
2002, p. 44) generating what Bernstein has named “Cartesian Anxiety” (Bernstein, 
1983, p. 18), and revisit the conceptualization of maturity and maturity models. We 
rely on conventions theory and a systemic-discursive perspective. These two lenses 
have both information & communication and self-producing systems as common 
threads. Furthermore the narrative approach is well suited to explore complex way of 
thinking about organizational phenomena as complex systems. This approach is 
relevant with our object of curiosity, i.e. the concept of maturity and maturity models, 
as maturity models (as standards) are discourses and systems of regulations. The 
main contribution of this conversation is that we suggest moving from a neo-classical 
“theory of the game” aiming at making the complex world simpler in playing the 
game, to a “theory of the rules of the game”, aiming at influencing and challenging 
the rules of the game constitutive of maturity models – conventions, governing 
systems – making compatible individual calculation and social context, and possible 
the coordination of relationships and cooperation between agents with or potentially 
divergent interests and values. A second contribution is the reconceptualization of 
maturity as structural coupling between conventions, rather than as an independent 
variable leading to organizational performance.  
 
Keywords: maturity, maturity models, management fad, neo-classical economics, 
organization theory, conventions theory, systemic-discursive perspective. 
 
 
 
Page 3 / 41 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
We start this paper with a trivial observation about management approaches that are 
unable to provide relevant guidelines to cope with uncertainty, and trust of our 
modern worlds (Hock, 1995).  Thus, managers are looking for reducing uncertainty 
through information-supported decision-making, sustained by ex-ante rationalization. 
They strive to achieve best possible solution, stability, predictability, and control of 
“future” (Gomez, 2006; Stacey, 2010).  Hence, they turn to a plethora of “prescriptive 
panaceas”, and “management fads” (Jackson, p. xiv) to bring simple solutions 
through best practices (Kurtz, & Snowden, 2003). 
 
However, these solutions are ineffective. They address only one part of a system 
(e.g. an organization) instead of the whole. They miss the interactions and 
interdependencies with other parts leading to “suboptimization” (Jackson, 2003, p. 
xiv). Further, as demonstrated by Stacey (2010, p. 13), there is a “lack of evidence 
base for prescriptions of the dominant discourse”. Classical cause-effects 
investigations and researches are not very helpful to this regard, and once again, we 
posit that:  
 
-­‐ The difficulty of providing traditional scientific evidence (generalizable 
knowledge about causal relationships) in an uncertain and complex world 
(Stacey, 2010, p. 17); 
-­‐ The above, because of the problem of demonstrating causal relationship “if 
x… then y” (not statistical correlations or associations), with regards to the 
non-repetitiveness of events in non-linear uncertain and complex set of 
relationships between variables or factors, by contrast with linear 
relationships, where causalities are certain, leading to define and produce 
optimal state (efficiency), rational decision-making (autonomous choice and 
rational selected goals based on calculation), and formative (revealing and 
realizing a mature form already given) (Stacey, 2010, p. 48).  
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Hence, the dominant evidence based fad notwithstanding, and its onto-
epistemological fault line (Eikeland, 2008, p. 25) “managers are called upon acting of 
facts rather than on beliefs, personal experience, and politicking, and to continually 
test, probe, and experiment with their approaches to the organization” (Stacey, 2010, 
p. 15).  
 
1.2 Focus and approach 
 
Where do we go from there? Jackson (2003; total systems intervention and critical 
systems practice), and Stacey (2010; complex responsive system coupled with 
related tools and techniques (Jackson, 2012) suggest more holistic approach. In this 
conversation, we want to shed some lights on the problem of management discourse 
fad using the concept of maturity and maturity models in the context of temporary 
organizations. 
 
Global economy is characterized by use and development of standards (Bredillet, 
2003; Brunsson et al., 2000). Compliance to standards as a practice enables better 
decision making by managers in uncertainty, control complexity, and higher 
performance (e.g. ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, definition 3.6; Hatto, 2010, p. 7). Amongst 
the plethora of standards, organizational maturity and maturity models hold a specific 
place due to general belief in organizational performance as dependent variable 
(March & Sutton, 1997) of (business) processes continuous improvement, grounded 
on a kind of evolutionary metaphor. Organizational maturity is defined as “a measure 
to indicate how excellent business processes can perform i.e. expected performance” 
(Van Looy et al., 2012, p. 2) or “that allows organizations to evaluate their capabilities 
with regard to a certain problem area” (Rosemann & de Bruin, 2005, p. 2; Röglinger 
et al. 2012, p. 329; also see Van Looy et al, 2011b,p.1127-1128). From an “objective” 
third-party assessment and continuous improvement perspective, (Mettler, 2011, p. 
82), maturity models are defined as follows: “Based on the assumption of predictable 
patterns, maturity models basically represent theories about how organizational 
capabilities evolve in a stage-by-stage manner along an anticipated, desired, or 
logical maturation path (Gottschalk 2009, Kazanjian & Drazin 1989)” (Pöppelbuß & 
Röglinger, 2011, p. 4). Building on this, Van Looy et al. state that maturity models 
“are evolutionary models for measuring (as-is) and improving (to-be) maturity, or ‘the 
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extent to which an organization consistently implements processes within a defined 
scope that contributes to the achievement of its business goals’ (ISO/IEC, p .2)” (Van 
Looy et al, 2011a, p. 3). Maturity models serve three distinct purposes (de Bruin et 
al., 2005; Pöppelbuß & Röglinger, 2011, p. 4—5): 1) Descriptive purpose, including 
the assessment of the current situation (as-is level) against given criteria and the 
methodology. The level of maturity can be communicated and used to by both 
internal and external stakeholders; 2) Prescriptive purpose, including identification of 
the desirable situation (to-be level), and selection of improvements to be 
implemented. This aspect has an internal focus; 3) Comparative purpose, aiming at 
internal or external benchmarking. This purpose relies on external factors such as 
industry standards and adoption, availability of data and information suppliers-
customers market practices. With regards to their purposes of use, the development 
of organizational maturity models are understood as “innovative artefact useful for 
coping with human and organizational challenges” (Pöppelbuß & Röglinger, 2011, p. 
5), relying on design science (Rosemann & de Bruin, 2005; Mettler & Rohner, 2009; 
Pöppelbuß & Röglinger, 2011; Mettler, 2011; Van Looy et al, 2011a; Van Looy et al., 
2001b; Van Looy et al., 2012). Design theories present different ways of using 
existing or new knowledge which leads to generate creative designs on one hand, 
and create designs resisting variation on the other hand (e.g. General Design 
Theory, Axiomatic Design, Coupled Design Process, Infused Design, and Concept-
Knowledge (C-K) Theory; Hatchuel et al., 2011).  
 
Maturity models are designed for and used in organizational context and settings. 
Heraclitus made it clear "No man ever steps in the same river twice" (Plato about 
Heraclitus' doctrine in Cratylus, 402a). On the ground of this fundamental statement, 
we suggest reversing the perspective between temporary and permanent 
organization, i.e. we pose that any organization is to some extent temporary, as 
transforming itself or part of itself in permanence. Thus permanent organizing is an 
extreme case of organizing, rather than temporary organizing. In our investigation we 
then consider the definition and context of temporary organizations described in the 
literature (e.g. Lundin & Söderholm, 1995, Packendorff, 1995, Bakker, 2010) as: 
“temporary organizational forms should be regarded “as inexorably interwoven with 
an organizational and social context which provides key resources of expertise, 
reputation, and legitimization” (Grabher, 2004a, p. 1492; Bakker, 2010, p. 468). 
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However, in contrast with Bakker, we argue that the relationships with the broader 
organizational and social context are dialogic (Wegerif, 2008, p. 347) rather than 
dialectic (Bakker, 2010, p. 481), meaning rooted of some mechanisms of 
coordination constitutive of meaning rather than on differences to be overcome. 
Therefore, we consider as a normal state of affairs, uncertainty (Stark, 2000, p. 3), 
hidden knowledge (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 697) and information with regards to 
communication and a pluralistic organizational context, i.e. “… characterized by 
multiple objectives, diffused power and knowledge-based work processes” (Denis et 
al., 2007, p. 179). The aspects will be developed later.  
 
Our intention is neither to offer a new “evidence based management fad” for 
practitioners, nor to suggest research gap to scholars. Rather, we want to open an 
assumption-challenging (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013) conversation with regards to 
main stream approaches, turning “our eyes away from the blinding light of eternal 
certitude towards the refracted world of turbid finitude” (Long, 2002, p. 44), and 
generating what Bernstein has named “Cartesian Anxiety” (Bernstein, 1983, p. 18), 
and revisit the conceptualization of maturity and maturity models. We rely on 
conventions theory (Dupuy et al., 1989; Gomez & Jones, 2000; Eymard-Duvernay et 
al., 2003; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Gomez, 2006) 
and a systemic-discursive perspective (Luhmann, 1992, 1996, 2005, Hernes & 
Bakken, 2003, Seidl, 2007). These two lenses have both information & 
communication (“discourse”, used here in a fundamental way, i.e. “all actions are 
embedded in a discursive context which defines the meaning of the action” (Seidl, 
2007, p. 202)) and self-producing systems as common threads (Luhmann, 1992, p. 
1420, 1422; Stark, 2000, p. 5; Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 700; Hernes & Bakken, 
2003, p. 1512; Gomez, 2006, p.222, 225; Seidl, 2007, p. 201, 202). Furthermore as 
aptly noted by Tsoukas & Hatch (2001, p. 980), the narrative approach is well suited 
to explore complex way of thinking about organizational phenomena as complex 
systems (also: Jackson, 2003, p. 258—260; Stacey, 2010, p. 89; Stacey, 2012, p. 
110). This approach is relevant with our object of curiosity, i.e. the concept of 
maturity and maturity models, as maturity models (as standards) are discourses, as 
shown by Brunsson et al (2000, p. 161) and systems of regulations (Brunsson et al., 
2000, p. 1; Gomez 2006, p.218).  
 
Page 7 / 41 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the conceptual articulation of the paper.  
 
 
------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------- 
 
1.3 Organization of the conversation 
 
After setting the scene in section one, we examine and describe, in section two, the 
concept of maturity and maturity model, and their building blocks through the 
traditional standardization perspective, unveiling fundamental assumptions. We 
discuss the neoclassical economic and organization theory roots. This leads us to 
consider the limitations of the traditional perspective with regards to the pluralistic 
context of temporary organizations and to suggest revisiting the concept of maturity 
and maturity model to enrich the theory. The conventions theory and systemic 
discursive perspectives are developed in section three. In this, firstly, we define the 
notion of convention according to its sociological economic perspective and 
secondly, we discuss how a conventionalist approach can enrich the concept of 
maturity models. The concept of maturity as structural coupling between conventions 
part of the same “ecology of discourse” is then analysed. In the concluding section, 
we offer a summary contrasting the classical standardization perspective with the 
richer conventions theory and systemic-discursive perspective, as well as some 
implications for maturity management. We close the conversation, underlining some 
areas for further research.  
 
2. Maturity and maturity models theoretical underpinning: a need for alternate 
perspective 
 
The above discussion on maturity models under the classical standards, and 
standardization perspective leads us to underlying domains supporting this 
perspective: the neoclassical economics and organizational theory. 
 
2.1 Neoclassical economics roots 
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Neoclassical economics, the dominant school in economics, relates to supply and 
demand to an agent's rationality, and his or her ability to maximize utility and value by 
employing available information and factors of production (e.g. 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/neo-classical-
economics.html#ixzz2PuxVuxbt, accessed 9 April 2013).  
 
The following are three assumptions of neoclassical theories (Gomez, 2006, p. 219): 
 
-­‐ Individual agents have rational preferences and are intelligent and capable of 
interpreting the signals they receive; 
-­‐ They are autonomous, define the own private utility or profits – individuals 
maximize utility and firms maximize profits – specially the one leading them to 
be concerned by such or such information; 
-­‐ Any exchange between agents, acting independently, is located par 
reciprocal, full and relevant information. 
 
Considering the previous development we note that standards are expected to 
achieve benefits such as increased productivity, access to new markets, and 
facilitate free and fair global trade. All these benefits are rooted in rationality, utility 
and profit, and transparency of information. The definition of standard itself is related 
to market equilibrium. This perspective is supported by calling on theories such as 
the resource based view (“increasing productivity”), the market-based view (“market 
needs”), and the encompassing stakeholder-based view (“multi-stakeholder process). 
Maturity models are very strongly related to a resource-based view (“organizational 
capabilities”, “achievement of business goals” “competitive advantage”), as well as 
the broader stakeholder-based view (e.g. the different purposes of use). The market-
based view is characteristic as well (descriptive purpose of use and degree of 
abstraction of the information). 
 
2.2 Organization Theory(ies) roots 
 
 Besides these above-mentioned relatively obvious roots in neoclassical economics, 
three key aspects are to be emphasized in relation to organizational theory(ies).  
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First, maturity models (standards) are established by consensus, and facilitate 
interoperability, and consensus among stakeholders by relying on equilibrium 
enabling predictability (Stacey, 2010, p. 20).  Under this view, mutual coordination 
(Parsons & Shills, 1951) between two parties occurs via a normative orientation, 
common norms and values that exist prior to the interaction, and “can only take place 
against a common background of meaning that is abstracted from the particularity of 
the situation (Parsons, 1951)” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1516). This normative 
orientation forms the double contingency that is imposed on them (Hernes & Bakken, 
2003, p. 1517).  
 
Second, maturity models aim at enabling actions on the basis of full and available, 
relevant, and transparent information. From the equilibrium based view of 
“organization, we are moving towards “organizing” (Weick, 1974, 1979). This is 
supported by process-based theories where “The focus on actions rather than on 
structure puts the subject in the center and opens up subjective interpretations of 
organizational reality” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 21).  Subjects are assumed to be 
acting autonomously, setting goals, and making rational decisions founded on 
availability of information (Stacey, 2010, p. 11). Maturity models are designed to 
support rational assessment on the basis of transparent information, decision-making 
and improvement actions.  
 
Third, because of the assumptions made about consensus and transparency of 
information, individuals are assumed able to act on the basis of stable, certain 
structures enabling complexity reduction and calculation of the likely outcomes of 
their actions. This assumption about certainty is embodied in standards (see ISO 
definition).  
 
2. 3 However…  
 
Brunsson et al. (2000, pp. 169—172) summarize the “pros” vs. “cons” standards and 
standardization debate. For the “pros”, standards are effective way of transmitting 
information (content, compliance or accreditation/certification). They have 
coordinating function (products, actors) and reduce the amount of information 
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needed. They bring some degree of simplification reducing the number of 
possibilities to be considered. They offer “good” or “best” practices providing good or 
best solutions, and they support innovation. Lastly they facilitate similarity, helping to 
manage for instance interface between systems, making things much easier for 
industries or consumers. From the “cons” perspective, maturity models are seen as 
reducing freedom and restricting intervention from people from the outside and 
imposing restrictions on uniformity to products, services, markets… They lead to 
restrain differentiation, and thus inhibit innovation and creativity by making people or 
organizations more alike..  
 
Despite this debate between the “pros” and “cons” of standards and standardization, 
its response to the organization’s performance problems still remains.  More 
“standard” standardization is expected to lead to higher performance. Often agents 
are confounded by the illusion of control created by equilibrium, and processed-
based views of maturity models, rooted in the “mechanistic and rationalistic theories 
that have historically dominated organization and management studies” (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 655). This is notwithstanding the fact that quantitative 
management studies, which have modelled performance as a dependent variable, 
failed to deliver their promise of managerial advice (March, & Sutton, 1997). Along 
with other authors (Daft & Buenger, 1990; Lampel & Shapira, 1995), the general 
conclusion drawn by Kieser & Nicolai (2005) is that “the search for stable success 
factors is as futile as the search for the philosopher’s stone” (p. 276) and that “the 
potential of performance research to create actionable knowledge is limited” (p. 275).  
 
If we want to make sense of this debate, we need to go beneath the surface of the 
opinions, and revisit the very assumptions on which the normative perspective is 
grounded.  
 
On a neoclassical economics standpoint, the assumption made by the standard 
model is that the rules of the game are stable: decision made on the basis of 
calculation (utility) supported by information today will still make sense in the future. 
Thus two kinds of information- information about future state of rules of the game, 
and about the decisions made must be reliable.  Uncertainty comes from two 
aspects: according to Knight (1921), there is never a comparable situation in the past 
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that can provide relevant information and guidance for the future, while for Keynes 
(1936, 1964), uncertainty occurs from the choice of one individual depends on 
simultaneous and non-predicable choice of other individuals. In this context of 
fundamental uncertainty (Dequech, 2001) information transfer is not sufficient to 
ensure coordination between actors. Furthermore, Dequech (2011) aptly explains, 
several types of uncertainty are considered in economics: weak uncertainty (defined 
by a fully reliable probability distribution), and by contrast strong uncertainty (absence 
of such distribution). Weak uncertainty is linked to substantive uncertainty (lack of 
some relevant and good-quality information), while strong uncertainty is linked to: 1) 
substantive uncertainty, including on the one hand ambiguity (uncertainty about 
probability, pre-determined or knowable ex ante list of events or states usually 
known, and thus utility can be calculated) and on the other hand, fundamental 
uncertainty (possibility of non-pre-determined structural changes, non-pre-
determined or not knowable ex ante list of events or states); 2) procedural 
uncertainty (limited cognitive and computational capabilities of the agents). Under 
conditions of fundamental uncertainty, self-interested agents cannot act rationally, 
according to neoclassical economics, i.e. cannot calculate ex ante as they lack of 
stable information and means of evaluation. This applies to the design and use of 
maturity models: defining possible future states (maturity levels), and information 
supposed to guide decision and action ex ante seem to raise questions...  
 
Considering the organizational theory standpoint, the organizing context, described 
as “Chaordic” (Hock, 1995), shows increasing volatility, uncertainty, ambiguity and 
complexity affecting organizations and the socio-economic environment within which 
they operate. Two main dimensions are considered having a key impact in 
organizational studies and organizing: uncertainty, and its two dimensions- volatility 
and ambiguity, and, complexity. Because action (e.g. the making of organizing via 
maturity models takes place over time), and because the future is unknowable, action 
is inherently uncertain (Aristotle, 1926, 1357a; Von Mises, 1949). Acts involve time, 
irreversibility, indeterminacy and contingence, uncertainty and therefore risk. Thus 
volatility (rate and unpredictability of change in an environment over time which 
create uncertainty about future conditions), and ambiguity (degree of uncertainty 
inherent in perceptions of the environmental state irrespective of its change over 
time), are two dimensions of uncertainty (Carson et al., 2006, p. 1059).  
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Stacey (2010, p.53) contends that the reality of uncertainty is lined to organizational 
complexity, and the interdependence of the agents. Further, he poses the question 
“Is the future given, or is it in perpetual construction?” (Prigogine, 1997). Addressing 
this question, Stacey defines two main categories of causalities: 1) causalities of 
certainties, supporting neoclassical economic principles, and 2) causalities of 
uncertainties. The causalities of certainties are: a) efficient (“universal, timeless laws, 
of “if-then” kind”), b) rationalist (“human reason within ethical universals”), c) 
formative (“unfolding a whole or mature form already unfolded at the beginning in the 
rules of interaction”); while the causalities of uncertainties are: d) adaptionist – 
random variation in individual entities / natural selection following some Darwinian 
evolutionary approach and biology analogies, where the work of organizational 
theorist focus on routines, and institutional economics seeks legitimacy over 
competitiveness (Stacey, 2010, p. 55); and e) transformative, where “local interaction 
forming and being formed by population-wide patterns”, and in a movement 
“perpetually constructed by the movement itself as continuity and transformation, the 
known and the unknown, at the same time” (Stacey, 2010, p. 67). If maturity models 
design and use relies on the causalities of certainty, their ability to address the 
complex and uncertain world seems to be questionable, under the organizational 
theory lens.  
 
The inherent uncertainty, about information and lack of knowledge about future 
events or states, challenges the neoclassical economics assumptions of information 
transparency. Agents need to interpret (coding / decoding) the information in order to 
make sense of it, and information is not a kind of “pure” flow. Thus, agents’ actions 
cannot be, according to neoclassical economics theory, only the product of rational 
calculation where the information is fully accessible and transparent (Gomez, 2006, 
p. 220). 
 
Considering the conditions of fundamental uncertainty and the resulting necessary 
information interpretation, rather than transparent information, leads to raise the 
questions of consensus, the problem of double contingency, and the challenge of 
cooperation. Contrasting the neoclassical approach, the assumption of pre-existing 
norms binding the decisions and actions of the agents cannot be held relevant in a 
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context of perpetual movement and transformation. Hence, “consensus is but one 
possibility for interaction” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518). Social systems 
evolution is in essence transformative and not deterministic (Stacey, 2010). Thus, 
“contingency lies in the interaction rather than at the abstracted level of norms and, 
as such, it sets the stage for the emergence of the social system. Social order should 
not be explained transcendentally, but as a circular movement that has neither 
beginning nor end (Luhmann & Schorr 1990).” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518). 
For Luhmann (1996) norms develop over time, not in an evolutionary “natural and 
inescapable” way (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518), but rather is a transformative 
way (Stacey, 2010, p. 58). Thus, in a Luhmannian perspective and complex systems 
perspective: 
 
“a cooling of the assumption of the importance of common norms may well help 
us better understand how cooperation forms in less institutionalized organizations 
such as virtual and temporary organizations, where the assumption about the 
prevalence of norms particular to the organization in question is less applicable.” 
(Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518) 
 
The inherent interpretation of information and the fact consensus and cooperation 
are not the stable and deterministic result of a double contingency coming from some 
transcendental norms and values but rather the transformative fruit of interactions 
within social systems have a major implication in the way we should consider the 
“design”, the role(s) and relevance of maturity model. Despite the inherent complexity 
of organizational phenomena and uncertainty about the future, agents make choice 
and act, which involves the existence of some mechanisms enabling to cope with 
uncertainty and make decisions. How would agents be able act in the absence of 
structure for calculating the likely outcomes of the actions leads? (Gomez & Jones, 
2000, p. 696). Our point is that conventions, as defined below close the gap between 
“free will [of calculating individuals seen under the lens of neoclassical economics] 
and social context [social determinism under the structuralist lens] interact to produce 
both structure and action” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 696, p. 706, [our contention]).  
 
Thus, by not limiting the analysis of maturity models to neoclassical economics and 
to organizational equilibrium-based and process-based theories, we wish to open up 
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for alternative explanations to understand maturity models, i.e. how agents with 
divergent values and orders of worth achieve cooperation, coordination and 
regulation, the overarching purpose of maturity models: “The idea that common 
norms are not a sine qua non for social action enables a broader repertoire of 
organizational forms to enter into the analysis” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518). 
The alternative explanations we suggest build on a holistic recursivity-based 
approach (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1524) which includes aspects such as self-
reference, self-producing systems (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1422, Hernes & Bakken, 
2003, p. 1513; Seidl, 2007, p. 202; Stacey, 2010, p. 204; Stacey, 2012, p. 9). To do 
this, we use conventions theory and a Luhmannian systemic-discursive perspective.  
 
3. An alternate approach: conventions theory and systemic discursive 
perspective 
 
3. 1 Conventions theory 
 
Firstly, we define the notion of convention according to its sociological economics 
perspective and secondly, we discuss how a conventionalist approach can enrich the 
concept of maturity models.   
 
The conventionalist perspective focuses on the coordination of human activities and 
cooperation between agents with or potentially divergent interests and values. In 
doing so, the conventionalist approach is interested in the systems of values shaping 
the interactions between individuals. Addressing problems of regulations, rules, 
norms and cognitive aspects, of methodological individualism and social holism, the 
conventionalist perspective presented here is to be seen as an integrative approach 
represented by the French economic sociology stream (see the foundational Special 
Issue “Revue Economique”, Dupuy et al., 1989) at the crossroad of economic, 
sociology and political science (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2003), and not as belonging 
to, for example neo-institutionalism (Daudigeos & Valiorgue, 2010), structuralism 
(Godechot, 2009), or normative school (Denis et al, 2007, p. 190).  
 
The question of regulation of human activities in society, how do individual and 
collective interests combine themselves within organization and markets in order to 
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have an efficient production of goods and exchanges, is at the heart of social 
sciences, economy and management discipline. Regulation involves rules, and a 
distinction can be made between governing and administering of rules: the former 
involves a system of rules and measures that order social agents, putting order in 
their actions and giving them orders; the later involves deliberate action, recognized 
as legitimate, on rules and measures, with the objective of increasing the efficiency of 
the behaviours of the agents submitted to the system of rules (Gomez, 2006). The 
conventionalist lens brings a new perspective, a paradigm shift, on the matter 
overturning some assumptions and taken-for-grant perspectives imposed by the 
dominant neoclassical economics model, and in particular with regards to the 
concept of information (Gomez, 2006, p. 218). Contrasting the neoclassical 
economics theory where information must be transparent or revealed at some point, 
another perspective suggests that the hidden part of systems behaviour, hidden 
knowledge, “constitutes a central element in the regulation of social interaction, 
precisely because it is not revealed” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 697). In order to 
investigate the nature and role of this hidden knowledge “constituting the very core of 
social organization”, we build on a conventionalist lens, providing a “new perspective 
on the embedded nature of the individual in society” (Granovetter, 1985), based on 
the work of Lewis (1969) and Gomez (1994, 2000).  
 
The “economics” view: reversing the perspective and shifting the paradigm 
 
In contrast to neoclassical economics assuming a universal given meaning of the 
information, conventions theory suggests that interpretation of information must be 
taken seriously, and that there is a logic to structuring of information, and that this 
logic is of primary importance in order to understand economic behaviours on the 
market and within the organizations. Firstly, conventions theory posits that there is no 
universal interpretation of the information. The social context in which the agents are 
embedded secures the system of rules enabling the interpretation of the information 
they handle, and then their behaviour. The system of rules forms a screen securing a 
system of interpretation of the information. Secondly, social context and individual 
agents and their behaviours are considered simultaneously. In conventions theory, it 
is impossible to separate the individual agents and system of rules in which (s)he 
evolves. An individual agent cannot decide alone in situation of uncertainty. Choice, 
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decision, information do make sense only because they are “measured” i.e. related to 
a system of rules. Thus the individual agent needs others to decide alone: “The 
individual independence is embodied in collective dependence” (Gomez, 2006, p. 
222).  
 
The system of rules in which agents situate themselves when they make a choice is 
called convention. Thus a convention enables to make sense and reasonable 
individual choices. Conventions and individual agents co-exist: “individual agents can 
make decision only because conventions exist, and conventions exist only because 
some individual agents adopt them” (Gomez, 2006, p. 222). Conventions theory 
simplifies the investigation with regards to information economy: the focus is on the 
relations between individual agents and the convention they refer to, instead of on 
the multiple relations of information between each of them. Convention brings new 
socio-economics lights to the relations between individual agents and the social 
context in which they are embedded, offering a paradigm shift (Gomez, 2006, p. 
221—224): 
 
-­‐ From individual agents rationality to rationalization, justification and 
legitimation; 
-­‐ From autonomous individual agents to rational mimicry of “normal” behaviour 
being the reasonable behaviour in front of uncertainty; 
-­‐ From information between individual agents to a screen of information making 
the others’ behaviours predictable (i.e. what they are supposed to do rather 
than what they do). Organizing is therefore focusing on the screen of 
information enabling individual agents to find some kind of dynamic stability 
with regards to their environment rather than organizing information between 
individual agents.  
 
Thus, the couple convention-individual agent forms a governing system, a system of 
rules and measures that order social agents. The on-going dynamic adjustment 
between individual agents and the rules enable regulation beyond any explicit 
“management” policy, and the “conviction” about the “normal” rules constitutes the 
social cement (Gomez, 2006, p. 224).  
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“The nature of conventions” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 697)  
 
What constitutes a convention? Gomez & Jones (2000, p. 700) answer: 
 
“A convention is a social mechanism that associates a rational void, i.e., a set of 
non-justified norms, with a screen of symbols, i.e., an interrelation between 
objects, discourses, and behaviors.”  
 
Under conditions of uncertainty, self-interested agents cannot act rationally, 
according to neo-classical economics, i.e. cannot calculate ex ante as they lack of 
stable information and means of evaluation. However, and said above, despite the 
uncertainty about the future, agents make choice and act, which involves the 
existence of some mechanisms enabling them to cope with uncertainty and make 
decisions. Coping with uncertainty involves moving rationality to rationalization 
(Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 698). In order to do so and to move away from the anxiety 
of uncertainty, choice and decisions are supported by providing a “reasonable 
reason” (not an “objectively rational” one) to oneself and to the others, and thus to be 
able to provide a justification for one’s behaviour. However this doesn’t address the 
problem of evaluation by the other of one’s justification’s validity.  
 
Moving away from this problem of cross-justification involves to assume the 
existence of beliefs considered as justified de facto, never discussed because taken-
for-granted. Referring to these non-justified beliefs, individuals do not need to search 
for others’ validation when making choice and decisions. These systems of non-
justified beliefs, “… central and inevitable in social life” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 
699) and “…making compatible individual calculation and social context, and 
permitting their co-construction and co-evolution” (Schumpeter, 1989), are called 
“rational voids” (Gomez, 2006, p. 698). Therefore, investigating the way 
organizations and/or markets operate requires investigating individuals behaviours 
and the rational voids they refer to. Interestingly the concept of rational voids enables 
to get a full understanding on the notion of bounded rationality in contrast to the 
neoclassical economics view. Here, bounded rationality is not human cognitive 
limitation (March & Simon, 1958), but rather a rationalization process based of a set 
of non-justified beliefs which enables individuals to calculate, make choice and 
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decisions. Boltanski & Thévenot (1991, 2006) demonstrate in their sociological theory 
of value (orders of worth) that “there is not just one way of making value but that 
modern economies comprise multiple principles of evaluation – multiple orders of 
worth” (Stark, 2000, p. 3). For Boltanski & Thévenot (1991, 2006) orders of worth are 
not values balancing value (the American institutionalists’ view), but they are the 
“very fabric of calculation, or rationality, of value” (Stark, 2000, p. 4). They posit that 
bounded rationality is not a cognitive limitation but rationality made possible “as it 
takes place within the boundaries of particular orders of worth” (Stark, 2000, p. 4). 
We can therefore speak of “bounded rationalities” rather than bounded rationality. 
Thus, orders of worth (conventions) are a way of dealing with risk and uncertainty, 
transforming uncertainty into risk, as they are “engine for turning situations into 
calculative problems” (p. 4). 
 
In order to avoid the questioning of the non-justified beliefs by an individual and to 
make sure others reason in relation to a same rational void than an individual agent, 
a rational void “is surrounded by a screen of information which provides individuals 
with signals that they share the same assumptions, and also distracts their attention 
from questioning it” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 699). This screen of information 
operates a screen of symbols, where objects, discourses and behaviours linked 
together make sense through their interrelationships, and “they signal the existence 
of a common interpretation of the information they convey” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 
700). Boltanski & Thévenot (2006) and Boltanski & Chiapello (2005) pay specific 
attention to agreements and coordination amongst agents within and between 
organizations are formed. Their work illuminates the way the screen of information, 
as system of equivalence embedded within the system of rules – what they name 
“order of worth” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) and plays its role in the dynamic 
interaction between agents in specific situations. They reject pure sociological 
(culture, norms imposed from “outside”) and neoclassical economics explanations. 
They suggest a need for conventions between agents, i.e. as seen above, a system 
of reference providing a common order of worth facilitating for each agent to 
characterize (representation and interpretation) a specific situation, providing 
guidance in the relationships, and enabling agreement and coordination. 
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This view contrasts the neoclassical economics view of “complete and transparent” 
information, moving to the notion of “convincing” symbolic information creating “social 
opaqueness” (Dupuy, 1989), communication through symbols which removes 
uncertainty and doubts about the “normal” way of operating.  
 
Complementing the definition provided above, we can make few important remarks. 
First, individuals adopting a given convention interact with the same screen of 
symbols; Second, convention and individuals, forming a “governing system” (Gomez, 
2006, p. 224), inseparable from each other; Third, a convention does exist, is self-
fulfilling and stable because the individual agent believes that others believe in it; not 
because s/he believes in the convention per se.  
 
The morphology of a governing system and its dynamic of evolution 
 
In order to understand how conventional systems of rules are constituted and how 
they modify and transform themselves, we need to consider two characteristics of a 
convention: morphology and complexity.  
 
Using the work of Boltanski & Thévenot (1991, 2006) and Le Moigne (1990), Gomez 
(1994, 1996) proposes a general framework describing the morphology of any 
convention (Gomez, 2006, p. 224). We must note that a convention is not an ex nihilo 
construction, but is the result of individual agents’ behaviours accepting it because 
they are convinced that others are accepting it. A convention conveys the conviction 
about its own generalisation. This can be done either by statement (discourse, 
narrative) or by material apparatus. Thus a convention is described by two sub-
subsystems constituting a general referential enabling comparison between different 
conventions or governing systems: 
 
Statement 
1. The Higher order principle providing the convention purpose, considered as 
“good”, “positive”, in the conventional rules; 
2. The distinction provides the typology of the different adopters of the 
convention, hierarchical relations between them and their relative place; 
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3. The sanction provides the motives for inclusion or exclusion of an individual, 
the boundary between the “normal” and the “outlaw”.  
Material apparatus 
1. The contacts indicate how agents adopting a same convention are interacting, 
if the often meet each other, in which occasions regular or specific; 
2. The technology indicates whether the link between individual and the 
convention is made via technical media, and whether this technique is a 
substitute to human being, and therefore to the capacity of interpreting rules; 
3. The negotiation examines the degree of tolerance enabling the interpretation 
of the rules without undermining, challenging or calling into question the 
convention 
 
With regards to the complexity of a convention, Gomez argues that, because a 
convention is an information & communication system, it is possible to apply the 
General System Theory principles (Gomez, 2006, p. 226). Thus, the more a 
convention provides a lot of different signals to the adopters and not repeating them, 
the more complex it is. In this case adopters have little room for interpretation. 
Conversely, a convention is slightly complex when it provides few rules but repeat 
them often. In the latter case, adopters have a lot of room for interpretation. 
 
Linking morphology and complexity leads to analyse a convention using the principle 
of coherence of a convention: two elements of the morphology are “coherent” if they 
contribute to complexity in the same way. They are said “dissonant” if each of them 
has an opposite impact on complexity.  
 
This enables to analyse the dynamic of evolution of conventions (Gomez & Jones, 
2000): depending the degree of coherence, a convention can be more or less 
convincing for the adopters or potential adopters and therefore lead to confirmation, 
modification or disappearance of the governing system (convention – individual 
agents). The governing system acts on individual agents and is acted by them. Who 
governs the governing system? This system is a self-organizing and self-regulated 
system as behaviours and conventions (systems of rules) mutually and recursively 
interact according to the agents’ shared conviction.  
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Conventions are dynamically stable patterns. They evolve, modify themselves or 
disappear according to the way the individual adopters change their behaviours over 
time. In this evolution, both internal and external dynamics have to be considered. 
Internal dynamics is concerned by the process or routinization of behaviours. A 
convention provides individuals conformist behaviours, fruit of a conformist 
calculation, i.e. which behaviours are considered as “normal”. The more individual 
routine is coherent with the screen of symbols, the higher the number of other 
individuals who will adopt the routine. Thus an individual routine becomes a collective 
routine, a routinized behaviour, a non-justified rule for the adopters and a “normal” 
behaviour integrated in the rational void. However conventions are never isolated 
and alternative existing conventions leads to competition between the conventions, 
and to consider external dynamics. A convention gains adopters as it provides a 
better way, i.e. more coherent signals from the screen of symbols, to cope with 
uncertainty. If a competing convention is perceived, via signals received from the 
screen of symbols to be better, i.e. bringing more coherence between individual and 
collective rationalization in addressing uncertainty, then the individual will shift.  On 
this basis a convention can resist, providing more coherent signals, adapt, modifying 
the screen of symbols and structure to gain more coherence and survive, or collapse, 
the adopters moving to a more convincing convention.  
 
But how the individual action of an adopter can change a convention? No individual 
action can alone change a convention as a whole however they are interdependent. 
Adopters of convention refer to the screen of symbols and thus never question the 
rational void. In order to face dissonance perceived by non-conformists, the adopters 
can react by reinforcing the screen of symbols either by persuasion, altering the 
signals in order to decrease the dissonance perceived by non-conformists, or by 
violence, rejecting the non-conformists and dissonant signal. In both case, adopters 
tend to protect the convention from doubts (mistrust) and from questioning the 
rational void. From the point of view of the individuals facing dissonance, they can 
accept it, move to a more “attractive” convention, or act in order to improve the 
coherence between the signals of the screen of symbols. The later can be done 
through local and situational action on the screen of symbols. This discussion shows 
the role limit of any organizational and managerial action. Gomez & Jones (2000, p. 
705) make it clear: 
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“Managers are not planners and decision makers applying a supposedly pure 
rationality, as they are always included in a social environment which gives both 
sense and limits to their rationality. They do not choose to act in one convention 
over another, but rather, as individuals, to escape the inhibiting effect of 
uncertainty. Once again, for any individual, the fact that the diversity of 
conventions allows some room for doubt and ambiguity is paradoxically the fact 
which gives them some freedom for action.” 
 
“Management” supposes a volunteer action on the conventions i.e. on statement, 
material apparatus, complexity and coherence/dissonance, can modify the conviction 
of the adopters towards the convention and can therefore support or change the 
governing system by acting on the system of rules.  
 
Qualification and effort conventions 
 
After this description of the concept of convention, we now pay attention to two 
categories of governing systems, i.e. the market (qualification conventions) and the 
organization (effort conventions) (Gomez, 2006, p. 228—234) and to their interface. 
This interface is the locus of the maturity discourse.  
 
The neoclassical economics “universal” conception of standard market involves a 
very specific system of rules and related assumptions. Agents cannot (mostly) modify 
the rules of the game, and the automatic regulation by price competition remains a 
landmark, any competitive advantage being built on the basis of the ratio price / cost 
under condition of equilibrium between price / cost and quantity. This is despite the 
number of “specific exceptional cases” in order to try to better capture the facts, and 
thus leading to question the “universality” of the concept of standard market. 
Conventions theory enables us to shift our attention from the generic “market” to a 
“convention regulating exchanges”. In situation of exchange, individuals question 
both the calculated behaviour they should have to maximise their utility and the rules 
of the game defining the exchange. Each exchange is supported by specific rules 
(and thus, a discourse), which constitute the referential of exchange (behaviours, 
evaluation of the products of the exchange, codes, signals, symbols) for the choice 
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and decision to be made. The economic space is thus weaved of convention about 
the “quality” of the supplier and the customer. The “normal” behaviours of the 
supplier and of the customer are assumed to be shared and provide a reference for 
each. Each space of exchange is located as a specific governing system associating 
individual agents (suppliers, customers) and qualification conventions (reference, 
system of rules shared by a sufficient number of adopters). In contrast with the 
neoclassical market view where changes are always due to exogenous shocks, 
governing systems (space of exchanges) and rules of the game can change due to 
some endogenous modifications coming from the conviction of the adopters about 
what it is “normal” to do. In conventionalist term, the “pure” market is just one 
particular extreme case, and besides it, a large range of space of exchanges does 
exist.  
 
An organization can be seen as effort convention: the various stakeholders are 
interested in the survival or the development of its activities. However they are in 
fundamental uncertainty situation vis-à-vis the organization’s future as the behaviours 
of the one depends on the behaviours of the others (Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1936, 
1964). Here as well, the conventionalist approach reverses the perspective. Instead 
of focusing on the transfer of information between stakeholders, it aims at describing 
their referential(s) or orders of worth, i.e. the screen of information enabling the 
various stakeholders to be convinced that the rules of the game – the expected 
“normal” effort – according to which they decide and act, are shared. Here the 
governing system is a dual individual agent – effort convention. The individuals’ 
behaviours confirm the conventional rules which give sense of the behaviours in a 
self-organized system. As for any convention, the effort convention is dynamically 
stable and can evolve according to change of conviction of the adopters and with 
regards to its coherence. We can note that an organization is NOT an internal 
market. Relationships between individual agents are “normalized” differently, not 
according to “exchange” logic, but according to a contribution to “goal commonality” 
logic.   
 
3.2 Conventionalist perspective on maturity models 
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On the basis of this presentation of various aspects of conventions theory we can 
now provide a conventionalist lens of maturity models reflecting a recursive-based 
organizational perspective and to contrast it with the discussion of maturity models as 
standards rooted in neoclassical economics and in equilibrium-based and process-
based organizational theories as presented above.  
 
The overall aim of a maturity model is to facilitate some mutual coordination between 
agents and organizations based on a system of rules.  
 
Where the standard perspective focuses on consensus and order imposed by some 
kind of transcendental and pre-existing normative orientation, common norms and 
values, the conventionalist perspective focuses on the coordination of relationships 
and cooperation between agents with or potentially divergent interests and values. 
Thus maturity models, as conventions, are not deliberately designed from “out there” 
and used normatively but are dynamically emerge from some self-producing systems 
of rules and interpretation shared by adopters.  
 
The standard perspective assumes that maturity models use and support available 
transparent information and on that basis, the autonomous agents can make 
calculation and rational choice vis-à-vis the future in order to maximize their profits or 
their utility. By contrast, the conventionalist approach considers that the focus should 
be on the interpretation of information by agents and therefore maturity models 
should pay attention to the hidden knowledge and non-justified beliefs as they 
constitute the core component in the regulation of organizations as social system. 
Maturity models support, in this perspective, the process of justification leading the 
rationalization of “reasonable” choice and decision made in a context of lack of 
“transparent and available” information.  
 
In the standard maturity models world, because of transparent information and some 
kind of imposed consensus, certainty about the state of the affairs and predictable 
patterns are available. Maturity models are making a complex world simpler, and 
based on their calculations, optimal choices and decisions can be made. This is the 
place for “best” or “good” practices leading, in a predictable way, to organizational 
capabilities leading to sustainable competitive advantage and higher level of 
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performance. However, in a conventionalist perspective, the future is inherently 
uncertain. Therefore, maturity models are forming a screen of information, a screen 
of symbols constituted of discourses, objects and behaviours, providing agents with 
signals that they share the same set of non-justified beliefs or assumptions and 
interpretation of the information they can trust and on the basis of which they can 
relate to calculate, make choice and decisions.  
 
Some key functions of maturity models, following the neoclassical view, are that they 
support value creation, improve efficiency and enable management of risk on the 
basis of risk-taking calculation. Maturity models, in the conventionalist view, 
recognize various orders of worth (and value is just one of them), making bounded 
rationalities directed towards agents’ common goals and efforts (effort convention), 
i.e. rationality made possible within the boundaries of a particular order of worth, 
rather than bounded rationality, which is a cognitive limitation. Furthermore instead of 
focusing on efficiency in resource allocation to develop for instance sustainable 
competitive advantage, maturity models, in a conventions theory lens, are about 
increasing qualifications of organizations to have “better” (whatever it means) access 
to resources on the market via legitimacy (qualification convention). The 
consequence is, that instead of reducing all cases to management of risk under 
certainty (neoclassical view and rational calculation), maturity models, in the 
conventionalist approach, enable to “exploit” uncertainty, transforming it into risk via 
orders of worth, i.e. providing the rationalization for calculation.   
 
According to the neoclassical lens, a maturity model is designed in order to fulfil 
some defined purposes of use (basis, descriptive, prescriptive and comparative). 
While the most elaborated design approaches supported by advanced design 
theories (e.g. Concept-Knowledge (C-K theory)) enable to balance the 
generativeness and the robustness of the model, this view doesn’t recognize the 
emergent self –producing properties of maturity models as a governing system and 
its inherent dynamic of evolution leading to major issues such as an existing model 
widely spread within organizations but not convincing and trusted by the adopters 
and therefore of no relevance. Conventions, through their morphology reflecting the 
screen of symbols, and their level complexity, generate (generativeness of the 
screen of symbols vis-à-vis coping with uncertainty, rationalization and conviction of 
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the adopters) some degree of coherence or dissonance (the robustness of the 
maturity model) leading to its evolution. This raises the question of the management 
of the maturity models, including, design, use, evolution of the model. Managing 
presumes a volunteer action on the governing system, the couple maturity model – 
Individual agents, the system of rules and measures that order social agents. 
However, as said previously, the on-going dynamic adjustment between individual 
agents and the rules enable regulation beyond any explicit “management” policy, and 
the conviction about the “normal” rules constitute the social cement. Thus the way to 
“manage” (or act interpedently within) a maturity model, i.e. on discourses and 
behaviours, complexity and coherence/dissonance, is to modify the conviction of the 
adopters towards the maturity models and therefore lead them support or change the 
governing system by acting on the screen of symbols reflecting the system of rules. 
Building on this, we can see that, in a conventionalist perspective, the notion of 
“accountability” covers a broader field than in the neoclassical approach 
(bookkeeping and control based on “evidence”), i.e. to make both “bookkeeping and 
narration… We keep accounts and we give accounts, and most importantly, we can 
be called to account for our actions” (Stark, 2000, p. 5). As stated by Gomez (2006, 
p. 234) “Conventions Theory is a theory about the rules of the game rather than a 
game theory”. Organizing and managing is about playing against and/or challenging 
the rules of the game (i.e. norms, routines, dominant discourses, organizational 
habitus) in order to create new positions on the basis of organizational change, 
differentiation, innovation, entrepreneurship, rather than just playing the game 
according to rules. The conventionalist approach enables to understand this logic 
and to formalize this evolution, because the on-going dynamic adjustment between 
behaviours and rules via conviction about whether they are shared or not, is at the 
centre of the conventions theory interpretations.  
 
Thus, maturity models seen as conventions are understood as 1) fruit of both 
emergent and deliberate actions aiming at interdependently changing the rules of the 
game rather than playing a game with rules imposed from “out there”, 2) resulting 
from both coordination and accommodation between competing orders of worth and 
discourses, and critics of the predominant logics, 3) a demonstration, via its 
legitimacy, of the performance of the organization.  
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3.3. Maturity, structural coupling at the interface between effort and qualification 
conventions 
 
The above developments suggest an alternate perspective, rooted in conventions 
theory, for our deeper understanding of maturity models and their dynamic. On this 
basis, we can now define the concept of maturity, using the Luhmannian systemic 
discursive lens, as the structural coupling between effort and qualification 
conventions.  
 
The relation between effort and qualifications conventions is at the centre of the 
analysis of the interface between the organization and the space of exchange, the 
market. However, in the context of our focus on temporary organizations we should 
note that: 
 
-­‐ the coordination between a specific temporary setting (e.g. a project, a 
programme) and another temporary setting (e.g. the “parent” organization) is 
seen as a qualification convention (legitimacy, exchange logic); 
-­‐ the coordination within a temporary organization (as a whole) is seen as an 
effort convention (commitment to common goal logic); 
-­‐ the coordination between an organization (as a whole, including “internal” – or 
“related”, if shared amongst different “parent” organizations – temporary 
settings) and the space of exchange is seen as a qualification convention. 
 
Maturity models are different discourses, effort convention and qualification 
convention, for they are covering different logics, contribution to “common goal” logic 
for the former and “exchange” logic for the latter. The concept of maturity is the 
structural coupling between the two systems of rules / conventions / discourses. As 
stated by Gomez, this enables to “rethink some problematic such as Quality [here 
maturity], as the dynamic adjustment between the two conventions” (Gomez, 1994, 
2006, p. 235).  
 
Maturity models as autopoietic social systems 
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We consider conventions here to state that maturity models are autopoietic social 
systems as they are recursive, self-producing and self-reference systems (Luhmann, 
1992, p. 1421; Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1513). Furthermore, from the above 
discussion, we know that conventions theory is about “taking information seriously” 
(Gomez, 2006, p. 221) Thus, we can also say that it is also about “taking people 
seriously” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1422). Maturity models, as autopoietic social systems, 
carry the following characteristics: 
 
-­‐ Their basic building block is communication (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1423; Hernes 
& Bakken, 2003, p. 1514), and communication signals are “operated” via a 
screen of information / screen of symbols) (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 699, 
Gomez, 2006, p. 221); 
-­‐ Maturity models are emergent self-reproducing, self-organizing systems 
(Luhmann, 1992, p. 1425; Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1514), with no 
beginning and no pre-existing or permanent “entity” (Gomez, & Jones, 2000, 
p. 705; Gomez, 2006, p. 236); 
-­‐ Maturity models evolve on the basis of coherence / dissonance of signals 
received to support individuals’ rationalization and enable them to calculate 
and to make decisions. Each of these decisions, made at a point of time, is a 
special event, which marks the difference between “before” and “after” 
(Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1515). Each of these decisions, that is selection, 
and related behaviours generate continuous trust, mistrust or doubt, and 
therefore lead to the contingent evolution of the maturity models. (Gomez & 
Jones, 2000, p. 704; Gomez, 2006, p. 226); 
-­‐ Maturity models are operationally closed systems. First, in contrast with 
neoclassical economics theory, conventions theory do not consider 
information as transparent, but acknowledge the interpretation of the 
information via the screen of symbols surrounding the set of non-justified 
beliefs giving meaning to individual choices (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 698). 
Second, in a given convention bounded rationality, not to be understood as a 
cognitive limitation such as in neoclassical economic perspective, is the 
rationalization process based of a set of non-justified beliefs and screen of 
symbols which enables individuals to calculate, make choice and decisions. 
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(Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 699) and rationality made possible “as it takes 
place within the boundaries of particular orders of worth” (Stark, 2000, p. 4).  
-­‐ An important notion with regards to systems boundaries is that they can only 
be drawn from inside because they are defined by the system of rules, and the 
screen of symbols supporting the operational closure of the system via self-
reference. While being a demarcation from the environment it also allows for 
co-interpretation of this environment (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1519). A 
system is then both operationally closed (boundaries of meaning and symbolic 
interdependencies) and interactively open (they interact with their 
environment, system / environment dependencies). As stated by Hernes & 
Bakken, 2003, p. 1520, “a system must be closed in order to be open”, and 
this precisely the point with maturity models; 
-­‐ Maturity models are the bases by which agents with divergent values and 
orders of worth achieve cooperation, coordination and regulation (Gomez & 
Jones, 2000, p. 697; Gomez 2006, p.218; Boltanksi & Chiapello, 2005; 
Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Denis et al, 2007, p. 190). This perspective 
moves away from the double-contingency problem (external common “norms” 
forming the background of meaning (Parsons, 1951) existing prior the 
interaction between agents and imposed to them) and the normative vision of 
mutual coordination (Parsons & Shills, 1951; Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 
1518). The later, embraced by neoclassical economic, leads to “consensual” 
theories. Consensus is just but one possibility of interaction as established by 
Luhmann which “opens up alternative explanations for problems such as the 
relation between action and communication” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 
1518): 
 
“the main ethical as well as sociological tradition has tried to solve this 
problem by reference to the existence of norms and values in all human 
societies, explaining the “oughtness” of norms and values either by nature 
or by consensus or by some tautological circumscription.” (Luhmann, 1996, 
p. 509) 
 
-­‐ In Luhmann’s view, process (consisting of events) and structure are 
complementary: and presuppose each other: “structuring is a process and 
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processes are structured” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1522). Furthermore, 
actions are not seen as a characteristic of the agents with individual purposes, 
but as “residing is the system” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1522). The 
conventionalist view shares this perspective and Gomez & Jones (2000, p. 
696) point that conventions theory close the process / structure gap and “free 
will and social context interact to produce both structure and action” (Gomez & 
Jones, 2000, p. 696, p. 706). Hence, “convention and individual action are 
neither entirely independent nor entirely determinate”. (Gomez & Jones, 2000, 
p. 705).  
 
Maturity as structural coupling 
 
The structural couplings are forms of simultaneous relations, and analogical 
coordination between operationally closed systems, which are maturity models for 
the purpose of this study. Structural coupling has, therefore to be contrasted with 
causal relationships, digital coordination, or inputs-outputs operations in open 
systems as espoused by neoclassical economic view. Structural coupling does not 
contribute to the system’s operation with regards to self-reference and self-
reproduction but it is a specific mechanism by which the system relates to specific 
states or perturbations (e.g. deviations from expectations, dissonance with regards to 
the signals of the screen of symbols or the coherence of the systems of rules) in its 
environment (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1432). Systems have to cope with the perturbations 
routed by structural coupling, assimilating and accommodating such ambiguities. 
One important aspect, raised by Luhmann (1992, p. 1432) is that “the twin concepts 
of closure and structural coupling exclude the idea of information “entering” the 
system from outside”. Moving to discourse, Seidl (2007, p. 209), following a 
Luhmannian perspective, explains that, within an ecology of discourses – for instance 
interdependent maturity models, discourses cannot be studied independently, 
despite their autonomy because of the mutual interaction due to structural coupling 
between them. The “structures” of the discourses co-evolve. In case of discourses 
structural coupling occurs through “shared language”, i.e. concepts and their 
attached “labels” serving as signals helping “the various communications to orient 
themselves with regards to each other” (Seidl, 2007, p. 210). This shared language 
doesn’t imply that labels have the same meaning for each discourse, as meaning 
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provides from each discourse screen of symbols surrounding the rational void, and 
by very definition of operational closure, is unique to a closed system, i.e. to a 
convention, which in our case is a maturity model.  
 
We now understand how the interdependence between two different categories of 
maturity models, effort and qualification conventions, can occur via structural 
coupling, i.e. shared language and labels serving as common point of references for 
different maturity models (i.e. different discourses). Maturity models, as conventions, 
while being unique discourses, are however in mutual interaction through structural 
coupling, i.e. a shared “maturity” set of concepts and related labels (language). This 
interdependence and mutual adjustment and orientation between maturity models as 
effort convention (effort to contribute a common goal inside the “organization” or the 
network of organizations / alliance) and as qualification convention (“supplier – 
customer” exchange logic) is only possible via a shared “maturity” language. As a 
consequence, there are no universal norms leading to define the concept maturity 
and its models. Each maturity model is in essence linked to specific situation while 
being part an ecology of models (discourses) with which it mutually adjust through 
structural coupling. Furthermore, the shared general “maturity” concepts and related 
labels may take source in any of the specific discourses, as there is no specific 
centre within ecology of discourses, the relations between maturity models being 
symmetrical (Seidl, 2007, p. 210).   
 
4. Summary of the conversation and suggestions for way forward 
 
4.1 Summary 
 
In this conversation, we show that the roots of classical views of the concepts of 
maturity and models can be traced back to: Neoclassical economics (including 
resource, market, and stakeholder based views), and organization theory (including 
equilibrium and processed based theories). These two sets of theories as assume 
that: agreement based on consensus and normative double contingency, supported 
by transparent and available information, and foreseeable future, enabling rational, 
autonomous agents to calculate optimum utility or profit, in order to support choice 
and make decision. This drives the generally accepted and taken-for-granted 
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assumptions that best or good practices lead to higher level of performance and to 
the faith in “evidence-based” management.  
 
In order to provide deeper understanding of the problem of coordination of human 
activities and cooperation between agents with potentially divergent interests and 
values in a context of fundamental uncertainty, we then suggest shifting the attention 
to interpretation of information, where the role of hidden knowledge, because it not 
revealed, is central to the regulation of interactions within social systems. Drawing on 
this, we conceptualize an alternate and richer perspective for maturity models, as 
conventions, systemic-discursive and self-producing systems, within which 
coordination is based on the conviction about “normal behaviours” in reference to a 
system of rules communicated, via a shared screen of symbols, and making possible 
rationalization and calculation in the context of uncertainty and lack of knowledge. 
These models are, by nature, evolutionary and dynamically stable. Lastly, we 
emphasize the role of the concept of maturity, as structural coupling between two 
categories of maturity models, effort conventions focusing on a commitment to 
commonality of goal logic, and qualification convention focusing on exchange and 
legitimacy.  
 
Lastly, and probably the cornerstone of this conversation, the shared general 
“maturity” concepts and related labels are used and transferred between discourses 
(conventions i.e. operationally closed systems) where they have, by definition, 
different meanings (Seidl, 2007, p. 202). While discourses may share the same 
labels for concepts, the same words may have different meanings in different 
contexts or discourses (Luhmann, 2005) despite the illusion of shared sense. The 
transfer of a set of labels from one discourse to another is described as “productive 
misunderstanding” (Teubner, 2000, p. 408). This involve that the labels leave scope 
for interpretation, “linguistic ambiguity [and flexibility] …allowing words to take new 
meanings in the context of different language games [discourses]” (Ashley & 
Zammuto, 1992, p. 453).  
 
Table 1 summarizes the key tenets of the conversation.  
 
----------------- 
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Table 1 about here 
------------------ 
 
To conclude this conversation, we wish to emphasize that maturity models should not 
be seen as bringing some kind of illusion of “transparent information” and rationality, 
with the risk of becoming modern panopticons (Foucault, 1977), but rather should be 
viewed as autonomous and interdependent discourses rooted on a symbolic content 
and its capacity for protecting taken-for-granted beliefs and rational voids creating 
"social opaqueness" (Dupuy 1989), i.e. the conditions for rationalization and trust in 
situations of uncertainty, and that maturity models studies involve considering the 
“ecology of discourses” (Baecker, 2006; Seidl, 2007).  
 
4.2 Way forward 
 
This conversation is the prolegomenon to a broad research project. The concepts 
presented here form an investigation framework for in-depth analysis of about 70 
business process maturity models both under the neoclassical perspective and under 
a conventionalist and systemic-discursive lens. The purpose of the research, part of 
a Collaborative Research Centre in Management Complex projects & Programmes, 
is one the one hand, to increase the level of consciousness within the partner 
organizations, that “the search for stable success factors is as futile as the search for 
the philosopher’s stone” (Kieser & Nicolai, 2005, p. 276) and that “the potential of 
performance research to create actionable knowledge is limited” (Kieser & Nicolai, 
2005, p. 275); and on the other hand to develop alternate ways of deciding and 
acting through “reflexive” practice (Stacey, 2012, p. 112), with a special focus on how 
to “manage” the rules of the game with regards to maturity and maturity models.  
 
As research beyond maturity models, we investigate the role of standards as 
management fashion and their dynamic of emergence and evolution (Brunsson et al, 
2000, p. 151; Seidl, 2007, p. 209, 210).  
 
Finally, on a more conceptual standpoint, we explore the concept of standard and 
theory of standards through a praxis perspective (standards, in contrast to explicit, 
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externalised and formalised rules and norms, are seen as patterns to practices and 
ways of doing things) (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; 2008, p. 26).  
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Figure 1: Conceptual overview: maturity and maturity models, from a “theory of the game” to a “theory of the rules of the 
game” 
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Table 1: The concept of maturity and maturity models: a summary of the 
alternate perspectives 
Perspectives / maturity models  Neoclassical economics and 
organization theory 
Conventions theory and systemic-
discursive 
Theoretical “economics” roots Resource-based view, market-
based view, Stakeholder-based 
view 
Sociologic economics, sociological 
theory of value (orders of worth) 
Theoretical “organization theory” 
roots 
Equilibrium and process based 
views 
Recursivity-based view 
Key assumptions Information transparency Screen of information 
 Rationality of the agents Rationalization, justification and 
legitimation  
 Autonomous agents Mimicry of “normal” behaviours 
Key concepts Consensus, normative mutual 
coordination (double contingency), 
stability 
Contingency lies in the 
transformative nature of interaction 
between agents 
 Available “pure” information  Interpretation of information by 
agents 
 Knowledge about the future events 
and states, risk 
Fundamental uncertainty, 
indeterminacy of information and 
lack of knowledge about the future 
events or states 
 Efficiency  Legitimacy 
 Value Orders of worth 
 Control Accounts 
Regulation Focus on consensus and order 
imposed by some kind of 
transcendental and pre-existing 
normative orientation, common 
norms and values. 
Focus on the coordination of 
relationships and cooperation 
between agents with or potentially 
divergent interests and values. 
 Management: Playing “the game”, 
“game theory metaphor”.  
Management: challenging the rules, 
“theory of the rules of the game” 
metaphor. 
Maturity model “Based on the assumption of 
predictable patterns, maturity 
models basically represent theories 
about how organizational 
capabilities evolve in a stage-by-
stage manner along an anticipated, 
desired, or logical maturation path” 
(Pöppelbuß & Röglinger, 2011, p. 
4).  
Maturity models “are evolutionary 
models for measuring (as-is) and 
improving (to-be) maturity, or ‘the 
extent to which an organization 
consistently implements processes 
within a defined scope that 
contributes to the achievement of 
its business goals’ (ISO/IEC, p .2)” 
(Van Looy et al, 2011a, p. 3).  
Maturity model as convention: 
“A convention is a social 
mechanism that associates a 
rational void, i.e., a set of non-
justified norms, with a screen of 
symbols, i.e., an interrelation 
between objects, discourses, and 
behaviors.” (Gomez & Jones, 2000, 
p. 700)  
 
Two majors categories: 
 
-­‐ Effort convention (commitment 
to a common goal logic) 
-­‐ Qualification conventions 
(exchange, legitimacy) 
Maturity Independent variable leading to 
organizational performance.  
Organizational maturity can be 
defined as a measure “to indicate 
how excellent business processes 
can perform i.e. expected 
performance” (Looy et al., 2012) or 
“that allows organizations to 
evaluate their capabilities with 
regard to a certain problem area” 
(Rosemann & de Bruin, 2005).   
Structural coupling between 
different conventions 
 
